Every number below traces to a filing, a press release, or an independent industry source — read and cross-checked by an agent, not looked up in a pre-built database. Pick a company below, or read the two full research passes that proved the method.
Type any ticker or company name — US or European, tracked here already or not. This resolves it live, pulls its real multi-year financials, finds its actual peers and value-chain (customers/suppliers, not sector labels), pulls their financials too, and reasons to a specific verdict — the same procedure behind the two case studies below, run fresh, on whatever you ask for. A real pass reads several filings and takes a few minutes.
Every company above that's been analyzed — via this page or the nightly batch ingest — lands here permanently. This is a read of the existing database, not the research tool itself; use the box above to actually analyze something new.
Connecting to the database…
The first pass on Dometic was a single quarter's press release, restated. It took four rounds of "this is worthless" before the method below actually held up.
| SEK m | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net sales | 16,207 | 21,516 | 29,764 | 27,775 | 24,620 |
| Organic growth | −10% | +23% | −3% | −12% | −12% |
| EBITA margin (adj.) | 13.8% | 15.6% | 13.2% | 12.5% | 10.8% |
| Capex | 246 | 413 | 593 | 628 | 379 |
| R&D expense | 336 | 412 | 531 | 591 | 587 |
| Net result | 451 | 1,726 | 1,784 | 1,332 | −2,303 |
Gross margin held roughly flat (28–30%) through a three-year, double-digit organic decline. If Dometic were losing pricing power, gross margin would compress with volume — it hasn't, materially. The margin damage is operating deleverage — SG&A didn't shrink with revenue — not lost pricing power.
Source: Dometic 2024 Annual & Sustainability Report, key ratios table
Capex cut 40% (2024) the same year Dometic booked a SEK 2,000m goodwill impairment in Land Vehicles Americas — while R&D was essentially protected (591→587). A specific, deliberate choice of what to cut, not blanket austerity.
Source: Dometic 2024 Annual Report, Note 14 (impairment)
A real customer's own numbers, not Dometic's framing of them: Thor Industries (largest RV OEM) increased capex 15% (9mo: $85.1m→$98.1m) even as its own retail registrations fell 18% — the opposite direction from Dometic. Thor's dealer-inventory financing rose 6.7% while retail sell-through fell — a real channel-stuffing signal pulled from Thor's own 10-Q, not assumed.
Source: Thor Industries 10-Q, filed 2026-06-03, SEC EDGAR
Independent cross-check, not just the company's own telling: RVIA's monthly US RV wholesale shipment data (down 14.2% YTD through June 2026) independently confirms the decline; NMMA's marine data shows the opposite — stabilizing — matching Dometic's own claim that Marine grew while Land Vehicles didn't.
Sources: RVIA shipment reports; NMMA boating statistics
The Igloo/YETI comparison, closed properly: Dometic's Igloo brand (acquired 2021, ~$677–900m) sits inside a category where the direct public comp, YETI Holdings, runs a 48–58% gross margin — roughly double Dometic's group blend — and grew revenue every year shown, including straight through Dometic's downturn. The RV-linked pullback isn't category-wide.
Source: YETI Holdings 10-K/10-Q filings, SEC EDGAR
“Stable sales in a volatile market” — and the data says that's roughly true: real pricing discipline at the gross-margin line, real capital caution below it.
The opposite cycle from Dometic entirely — and the method produced a different, specific verdict instead of forcing the same story.
| £m | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 11,491 | 11,218 | 13,520 | 16,486 | 18,909 | 21,207 |
| Gross margin | −1.6% | 19.0% | 20.4% | 22.0% | 22.3% | 29.1% |
| NWC / sales | 21.7% | 27.0% | 34.5% | 36.8% | 30.7% | 27.4% |
| Capex / sales | 5.1% | 2.9% | 2.7% | 2.6% | 2.7% | 2.9% |
| R&D / sales | 10.5% | 6.9% | 6.6% | 4.5% | 1.1% | 2.3% |
Revenue has nearly doubled off the COVID trough — when grounded aircraft fleets drove gross margin negative in 2020 (an engine-flying-hours revenue model). Margin expansion has accelerated, not plateaued: +680bps in 2025 alone.
But R&D was cut hard — both in absolute £ and as a share of a fast-growing revenue base — consistent with the post-2023 strategy prioritizing installed-base profitability over new-program investment. A real, checkable forward risk, not hidden behind the good headline numbers.
A near-miss, caught by verifying before asserting: the filing mentions “MTU” seven times — every one is Rolls-Royce's own subsidiary (MTU Cooltech Power Systems), not the separately-listed MTU Aero Engines AG. Would have been a false relationship if taken at face value.
Real peers, self-disclosed by the company: Rolls-Royce's own remuneration committee report names its board's actual pay-benchmark peer set — Safran, GE Aerospace, RTX, BAE Systems, Northrop Grumman, Boeing — a legitimate shortcut to genuine comparables, filtered with judgment rather than taken wholesale.
The credibility of "every number is cited" rests on catching exactly this kind of thing — logged here rather than smoothed over.
Wrong HTTP header silently zeroed out ~68% of EU financial extractions — looked like missing data, was a 406 swallowed by a status check instead of raised.
Working capital formula used current assets minus current liabilities — gave 42–50% of sales against a company's own disclosed 18–30%. Corrected to inventory + receivables − payables, validated against the company's own figure exactly.
Revenue tag mismatch: most filers post-2018 use a different XBRL tag than the one originally checked — affected most modern US filers until caught.
IFRS & US-GAAP tag variants: different filers use different, equally valid tags for the same line item (receivables, payables, capex) — found on both the EU and US side, fixed to recognize every known variant rather than just the first one found.
Wrong relationship direction: assumed a company was a customer; a competitor's own filing revealed it actually competes in part of the same category. Fixed before it was written to the database as fact.
Transient connection drops mid-batch killed large runs silently. Added retry-with-backoff around every database write.
Two honestly different tiers — what's live right now, and what a real "type in a ticker, get a fresh report" build actually requires.
/scrutinize yourself, same as tonight